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Dialogue with Computers 
 
Paul Piwek    The Open University, UK 
 
Abstract  
With the advent of digital personal assistants for mobile devices, systems 
that are marketed as engaging in (spoken) dialogue have reached a wider 
public than ever before. For a student of dialogue, this raises the question to 
what extent such systems are genuine dialogue partners. In order to address 
this question, we propose to use the concept of a dialogue game as an 
analytical tool. Thus, we reframe the question as asking for the dialogue 
games that such systems play. Our analysis, as applied to a number of 
landmark systems and illustrated with dialogue extracts, leads to a fine-
grained classification of such systems. Drawing on this analysis, we propose 
that the uptake of future generations of more powerful dialogue systems will 
depend on whether they are self-validating. A self-validating dialogue 
system can not only talk and do things, but also discuss the why of what it 
says and does, and learn from such discussions.   
Introduction 
dialogue | dialog noun 
 
1 a. A literary work in the form of a conversation between two or more persons, in 
which opposing or contrasting views are imputed to the participants 
1 b. Music. A composition for two or more alternating voices. 
2 a. A conversation carried on between two or more people; a verbal exchange, a 
discussion. 
2 b. As a mass noun: conversation carried on between two or more people; 
discussion, verbal interchange. Now somewhat rare. 
2 c. Discussion between representatives of different countries or groups, esp. with a 
view to resolving conflict or solving a problem; an instance of this. 
3. Conversation between two or more characters in a literary work; the words 
spoken by the actors in a play, film, etc. Also: the style or character of the spoken 
elements of a work. 
4. Computing. 
4 a. The exchange of data between computers on a network; an instance of this. 
4 b. Chiefly in form dialog. = dialogue box n. at Compounds 2. 
  
(OED Online, June 2015) 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘dialogue’ has eight 
different senses (as listed above). Each of these senses identifies certain 
parties to a dialogue. These include persons, alternating (musical) voices, 
people, representatives of countries or groups, characters and even 
computers. Out of the eight senses, five (1a, 2a, 2b, 2c and 3) focus on 
dialogue as conversation.
1
 According to three of these senses, dialogue is, 
by definition, done by people (2a, 2b and 2c). The possibility of a machine 
as a dialogue partner is not countenanced. In contrast, at least one of the 
entries that concerns literary works (i.e. 3) is non-committal, speaking of 
‘characters’. And indeed, most of us have encountered machines capable of 
dialogue in fiction or films. What emerges from this dictionary entry for 
dialogue is a firm distinction between dialogue in fiction and dialogues in 
real life: the former permit non-human participants, whereas the latter 
exclude them.  
However, over the last decade this neat demarcation has been breached; 
machines that engage in dialogue seem to have infiltrated the real world. 
Personal assistants for mobile phones, think Apple’s Siri, Google Now and 
Microsoft’s Cortana, are available to anyone in possession of a reasonably 
modern mobile device. These assistants can help, for example, with booking 
an appointment or locating a place of interest. In future, their capabilities are 
likely to extend to many more everyday activities. 
With talking machines having made the leap from fiction into reality, it is 
timely to take stock. Is it still warranted to exclude machines from 
dictionary definition of dialogue? That question leads to other questions 
such as: What is the current generation of talking machines capable of? In 
what sense can they be said to engage in dialogue? How big is the gulf, if 
any, between them and the talking machines we know from film and 
fiction? In this paper we approach these questions by examining the ideas 
and technologies that sit behind the current generation of talking machines 
or, henceforth, dialogue systems. The discussion is aimed at an interested, 
but non-technical audience and includes a generous serving of transcripts of 
‘conversations’ with such dialogue systems.  
We will see that there is a large variety of dialogue systems. For instance, 
the medium of communication ranges from typed text and spoken language 
to virtual computer-animated agents and robots. The purpose of the dialogue 
differs significantly from system to system. We will encounter both 
dialogue systems that generate entire dialogue scripts (emulating the work 
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 As opposed to dialogue as a musical composition with alternating voices (1b) or  and data 
exchange with computers (4a and 4b) 
of the author of a book or play) and systems that engage in one-to-one 
dialogue. The emphasis will however be on the latter. 
To introduce some structure into the analysis, we deploy the notion of a 
dialogue game. This notion has been hugely influential in linguistics, 
philosophy, computer science and abutting areas in which dialogue is 
studied. Each dialogue system is described in terms of the dialogue game 
that it can play. The description of dialogue systems at this level of 
abstraction will facilitate comparisons between these systems. 
In the remainder of this paper, we proceed as follows. Section 1 looks at 
influential representations of talking machines in film. The section 
highlights a common template behind these representations. Section 2 
introduces the notion of a dialogue game. This section provides us with the 
tools to describe the dialogue systems that are introduced in the next two 
sections. Sections 3 and 4 deal with reactive and agenda-driven dialogue 
systems, respectively. Reactive systems have no explicit representation of 
purpose; they take the words of their interlocutor, reorganise these words 
and fire them back. In contrast, what an agenda-driven system says next 
depends not only on what the user has said but also on the system’s goals. In 
some sense, such systems have a mind of their own. Section 5, looks at 
recent research on dialogue systems. Finally, in Section 6 we take stock, 
returning to the questions that were raised in this introduction.     
1. Talking machines in fiction: HAL, Ava and Baymax 
HAL is possibly the most influential instance of a fictional talking machine. 
It features in ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’, which is both a novel and a film 
created alongside each other in a collaboration between the science fiction 
author Arthur C. Clarke and director Stanley Kubrick. HAL is the central 
computer of a spaceship and speaks with a rather artificial sounding voice. 
Its presence is marked by an ominous looking camera lens, which exudes a 
constant red glow.  HAL can be polite, express fears, and, as the ship’s crew 
find out, its own goals, when Dave is locked out of the spaceship: 
 
(1) Dave: Open the pod bay door please, HAL. Open the pod bay 
door please, HAL. Hello, HAL. Do you read me? Do 
you read me, HAL? Hello, HAL. Do you read me? 
 HAL:   Affirmative Dave, I read you. 
 Dave: Open the pod bay doors, HAL. 
  HAL: I’m sorry, Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do that. 
 Dave: What’s the problem? 
 HAL: I think you know what the problem is just as well as I 
do. 
 Dave: I don’t know what you’re talking about. 
 HAL: I know that you and Frank were planning to 
disconnect me, and I’m afraid that’s something I 
cannot allow to happen. 
 
A more recent instance of a talking machine that breaks free from its human 
masters is Ava. In Alex Garland’s 2015 film ‘EX_MACHINA’, Ava is a 
humanoid robot portrayed by the actress Alicia Vikander. Though HAL and 
Ava appear to have little in common on the outside, Ava, not unlike HAL, 
discovers that its goals diverge from that of the humans, in this case its 
creator Nathan, and solicits the help of Caleb, a programmer working for 
Nathan’s company. The following dialogue snippet is representative of their 
interactions:  
 
(2) Ava: Nathan isn’t your friend. You’re wrong. 
 Caleb: Wrong about what? 
 Ava: Everything. 
As we shall, even Baymax, the cuddly inflatable robot protagonist in the 
Disney film ‘Big Hero 6’, seems to fit, up to a point, the template that was 
established by HAL. Baymax is a personal healthcare companion. It tends to 
the needs of its human users. However, despite or perhaps because of its 
benevolent goals, Baymax can end up acting in ways that are in direct 
conflict with explicitly stated requests. Here is an interaction between 
Baymax and Hiro, a teenage boy: 
 
(3) Baymax I heard a sound of distress. What seems to be the 
trouble? 
 Hiro Oh, I just stubbed my toe a little. I’m fine. 
 Baymax On a scale of 1 to 10 how would you rate your 
pain (Baymax displays a scale from  to ). 
 Hiro A zero. I’m okay really. Thanks, you can shrink 
now. 
 Baymax Does it hurt when I touch it? 
 Hiro Naah. Okay. No touching. (Moves backwards to 
evade Baymax who is trying to touch his toe) 
I’m fine (loses balance and falls backwards). 
 Baymax You have fallen. 
 Hiro You think. 
 
The theme that emerges is one of conflict: conflict between the goals of the 
human interlocutor and the machine. In the case of HAL and Ava, the 
machine pursues its own goals whilst realising that these are at odds with 
those of its human interlocutors. In contrast, Baymax (at least in the 
dialogue fragment above) seems to stubbornly follow the script it has been 
given. It ignores any input that falls outside of this script. Part of the 
comical effect is derived from Baymax appearing to be genuinely oblivious 
to this fact. 
So much for the fictional machines. After an introduction to the concept of a 
dialogue game in the next section, the subsequent two sections deal with 
actual dialogue systems. In the concluding parts of this paper, we return to 
the question how these systems compare to HAL, Ava and Baymax.      
2. Dialogue Games 
Imagine this language: -- 
1). Its function is the communication between a builder A and his man 
B. B has to reach A building stones. There are cubes, bricks, slabs, 
beams and columns. The language consists of the words “cube”, 
“brick”, “slab”, “column”. A calls out one of these words upon which 
B brings a stone of a certain shape. Let us imagine a society in which 
this is the only system of language. The child learns this language 
from the grown-ups by being trained to its use. (Wittgenstein, 1958: 
77) 
In his later work, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) 
describes numerous hypothetical practices, such as the one given above. For 
these he coined the term ‘language game’. His aim was to show that the 
meaning of an utterance can be understood in terms of what one can do with 
the utterance (in this example, coordinate the actions between A and B). He 
did this partly to supplant his earlier picture theory of meaning with another 
metaphor: the use of sentences in conversation as moves in a game. He saw 
this change of metaphor as crucial for dispelling certain philosophical 
quandaries that the picture theory leads to (questions such as: ‘What does 
the number ‘four’ represent?’, ‘Do numbers exist?’, and so on. – arguably, 
these questions evaporate when the use of numbers is thought of in terms of 
practical language games).    
Wittgenstein’s idea of utterances as moves in a language game became 
hugely influential. Researchers in several disciplines developed it further. 
For example, the Wittgenstein scholar Erik Stenius proposed precise 
formulations of several dialogue game rules (Stenius, 1967). Another 
pioneer was the Australian philosopher and computer scientist C.L. 
Hamblin. He provided a firm basis for formal study of dialogue games or, in 
his terminology, dialectical systems (Hamblin, 1970). These strands of 
research prepared the ground for the use of the notion of a dialogue game in 
research on dialogue systems. Possibly the earliest example of such research 
is the work by Bunt and Van Katwijk at the Institute for Perception 
Research (a collaboration between Eindhoven University and Philips 
Research in the Netherlands). They draw on the analogy between dialogue 
and parlour games such as chess:   
What does it mean to view something as a game? A game is an 
activity in which the participants take turns in performing certain 
actions, chosen from the set of ‘legitimate moves’, in order to arrive at 
a preferred situation (‘favourable position’). Comparing this 
characterisation of a game with the characterisation of informative 
dialogues […] we can indeed view [dialogue] as a game, sequences of 
dialogue acts corresponding to moves, and the position that the 
players want to reach being a desired state of knowledge (…) think of 
a ‘position’ as an independent concept, as ‘configuration of pieces’, as 
is for instance common in chess. (Bunt and Van Katwijk, 1979: 266-
268) 
In the same spirit, we define dialogue games as consisting of two key 
components:
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 The terminology in this paper is rooted in the tradition that was started by Bunt & Van 
Katwijk (1979) at the Institute of Perception research (IPO). Our definition draws on 
subsequent work in this tradition at IPO, in particular: Beun (2001), Ahn et al. (1995) and 
Piwek (1998). Related approaches to dialogue (in terms of a rule-governed activity) have 
been developed by, for example, Ginzburg (2012) and researchers involved with the 
influential TRINDI project and its successors, see, e.g., Larsson and Traum (2003) and Bos 
et al. (2003).   
 (Definition) Dialogue Game 
 
A dialogue game consists of two principal components: 
 
A dialogue store, for keeping track of the current position.  
 
Dialogue rules which specify, for any given point in a dialogue, 
which dialogue acts are permitted at that point in the dialogue and 
how the store changes as a result of those actions. They are divided 
into two types of rules: 
 
a)  update rules, which specify how the dialogue store evolves in the 
course of a dialogue. 
b)  generation rules, which specify which dialogue acts are 
legitimate given a specific position (as recorded in the dialogue 
store). 
 
Additionally, each dialogue participant needs a dialogue strategy. Given a 
set of available legitimate dialogue acts for a position, the strategy picks the 
act which will actually be played, as illustrated in Figure 1. The analogy 
with the game of chess is helpful here. Think of the rules of chess that 
specify the possible moves of the pieces as the generation rules. Such rules 
determine the legitimate moves one can make at each point in a chess game. 
To play the game, every time it is one’s turn, one needs to select an actual 
move from the set of legitimate moves. 
 
We will see that in many dialogue systems, generation rules and a strategy 
are conflated: such systems have a single set of rules that determines the 
next dialogue act, without distinguishing between the legitimate acts that 
one is allowed to play according to the game and the actual act that is 
played.  
  
  
 
Figure 1: Playing a dialogue game involves participants, here A and B, taking turns. We begin 
with Dialogue Store 1, the initial dialogue store. Participant B performs a dialogue act. This 
results in Dialogue Store 2. Application of the update rules yields Dialogue Store 3. Given 
Dialogue Store 3, the generation rules determine which legitimate acts are available to B. From 
these legitimate acts, B’s dialogue strategy selects an act to perform. And so on. 
We have been purposely agnostic about the precise content of the dialogue 
store and details of the update and generation rules. We shall see that these 
vary with the dialogue game. A dialogue system can be thought of as 
playing a particular dialogue game that is fixed by the specific dialogue 
store and rules that are involved. Looking at dialogue systems in this way 
allows us to make explicit both similarities and differences between such 
systems.  
Before we look at some concrete dialogue systems and the corresponding 
games, we briefly address a prima facie objection to this view of dialogue. It 
may appear rather restrictive to think of a dialogue as governed by a set of 
underlying rules that can be mechanically applied. How can this be squared 
with the inherent flexibility and creativity of genuine dialogue? A variant of 
this objection is dealt with by Alan Turing, the father of computing, in his 
seminal ‘Computing machinery and intelligence’. He refers to it as ‘The 
argument from informality of behaviour’ (Turing, 1950:58). Turing points 
out that even though human behaviour may not appear to follow a clear set 
of rules, it doesn’t follow that such rules cannot exist. He points out that a 
computer programmed with a couple of simple rules can display apparently 
informal, unpredictable behaviour: 
I have a set up on the Manchester computer a small programme 
using only 1000 units of storage, whereby the machine supplied with 
one sixteen-figure number replies with another within two seconds. I 
would defy anyone to learn from these replies sufficient about the 
programme to be able to predict any replies to untried values. 
(Turing, 1950: 59)  
Of course, there are further simplifying assumptions behind the view of 
dialogue as a game. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into those, 
but see for example Piwek (2011).      
3. Reactive dialogue systems 
One of the earliest and most well-known dialogue systems is ELIZA. It was 
developed in the 1960s at MIT by Joseph Weizenbaum. Interaction with 
ELIZA is via the keyboard (through a chat interface). ELIZA takes on the role 
of a psychotherapist and does this quite convincingly. Weizenbaum (1966) 
reports that it was difficult to persuade some people that they were 
interacting with a machine.  
What follows is a, according to Weizenbaum, typical conversation with 
ELIZA:  
 
(4) 1 Human Men are all alike. 
 2 ELIZA in what way 
 3 Human They are always bugging us about 
something or other. 
 4 ELIZA can you think of a specific example 
 5 Human Well, my boyfriend made me come here. 
 6 ELIZA your boyfriend made you come here 
 7 Human He says I’m depressed much of the time. 
 8 ELIZA I am sorry to hear you are depressed 
 9 Human It’s true. I am unhappy. 
 10 ELIZA do you think coming here will help you not 
be unhappy 
 11 Human I need some help, that much seems certain. 
 12 Eliza what would it mean to you if you got some 
help 
 13 Human (…) 
 
(Extract from Weizenbaum, 1966: 36-37) 
Weizenbaum argues that: 
The whole issue of the credibility (to humans) of machine output 
demands investigation. Important decisions increasingly tend to be 
made in response to computer output. (…) ELIZA shows, if nothing 
else, how easy it is to create and maintain the illusion of 
understanding, hence perhaps of judgement deserving credibility. A 
certain danger lurks there.’ (Weizenbaum, 1966: 42-43).3  
At the same time, Weizenbaum suggests that once the lid is lifted on how 
the machine achieves this feat, ‘the magic crumbles away’. So let us briefly 
look at what makes ELIZA tick. To do so, we specify the dialogue game that 
it plays in terms of its dialogue store and rules.  
ELIZA’s game 
In the case of ELIZA, the dialogue store records the most recent input from 
the human user. For instance, consider dialogue act (4.7) by the human 
interlocutor, repeated here for the reader’s convenience: 
 
(5)  He says I’m depressed much of the time. 
 
This text is recorded on the dialogue store. In a first step towards converting 
this user input into a response, an update rule transforms certain pronoun-
verb combinations. In particular, there is an update rule that replaces 
occurrences of ‘I’m’ with ‘you are’. Thus the content of the dialogue store is 
changed into the following sentence: 
 
(6) He says you are depressed much of the time. 
 
Next, the generation rules are applied. Generation rules specify, given the 
content to the dialogue store, which dialogue acts are legitimate responses. 
ELIZA’s generation rules consist of two parts.  
 
Firstly, there is a decomposition template which may or may not match with 
the input text. For example, the following template matches with the 
(amended) input text:  
(7) you are sad / unhappy / depressed / sick …   
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 More recently, two researchers at Stanford University carried out a series of experiments 
to see how people treat machines. This led to an influential book entitled ‘The Media 
Equation’ (Reeves & Nass, 1996). In their book, Reeves and Nass argue that people do 
indeed tend to treat computers as if they were real people. 
Here, ‘…’ indicates an indefinite sequence of words.  
Secondly, the generation rule consists of one or more reassembly patterns, 
such as: 
(8) I’m sorry to hear you are sad / unhappy / depressed / sick      
 
 
The generation rule consisting of the aforementioned decomposition 
template and this reassembly pattern turns  
 
(9) He says you are depressed much of the time.  
  
into ELIZA’S response: 
 
(10) I’m sorry to hear you are depressed. 
  
Note that the generation rule ignores some of the input (‘much of the time’) 
and prefixes the response with the phrase ‘I’m sorry to hear’.  
ELIZA has a stock of generation rules. Each of these specifies a potential  
legitimate act. Its dialogue strategy is to try one rule at a time until a match 
has been found.
4
 Recall that a dialogue strategy determines how a specific 
dialogue act is selected from the set of legitimate ones (as specified by the 
generation rules). When a match between an input and generation rule has 
been found, a text is put together according to the reassembly pattern of the 
rule. Then the text is presented to the user (via the chat interface) and the 
store is wiped clean. The latter is effected by an update rule.  
If the input doesn’t match any of the normal generation rules, ELIZA will do 
of two things. Either it applies a rule of last resort. This rule matches 
regardless of the input text. The reassembly pattern is bit of canned text 
such as ‘I see’ or ‘that’s interesting’. Alternatively, it can draw on a phrase 
which it stored earlier on. For this purpose, there is a section of the dialogue 
store, labelled ‘memory’, in addition to the ‘input’ section we’ve made use 
of so far. Items can be added to memory by a special update rule. Whenever 
the system encounters ‘your …’ in the input text, it puts in the ‘memory’ the 
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 We are skimming over some technical details. In particular, ELIZA’s generation rules are 
actually ranked. Thus, the strategy is more sophisticated in that the system always first tries 
the highest ranked rules. There are other details of the ELIZA implementation (mostly due to 
the fact that in the 1960s computer memory was much more limited than today, 
necessitating various memory saving techniques). We’ve ignored those in our discussion. 
phrase ‘let’s discuss further why your …’ or ‘earlier you said your …’ and 
proceeds to respond in the usual way. If it later on encounters a situation 
where no rule matches, it can retrieve a phrase from memory and produce it. 
For instance, if earlier on in the dialogue the human interlocutor said ‘my 
boyfriend made me come here’, when the system gets stuck, it can be 
thrown into the conversation ‘let’s discuss further why your boyfriend made 
you come here’.     
Weizenbaum points out that he carefully selected the psychiatric interview 
in order to keep the number of generation rules for ELIZA under control. A 
psychiatrist gets away with saying ‘Tell me about boats’ in response to ‘I 
went for a long boatride’ because  
one would not assume that he knew nothing about boats, but he had 
some purpose in is so directing the subsequent conversation. It is 
important to note that this assumption is made by the speaker. 
Whether it is realistic or not is an altogether separate question. 
(Weizenbaum, 1966: 42)    
 
Beyond ELIZA 
The ideas that underpin ELIZA live on in the chatbots of today. There have 
also been efforts to address some of ELIZA’s shortcomings. For example, the 
way ELIZA matches an input with a response is rather brittle: it requires that 
the exact words of the decomposition template have been used by the 
human interlocutor. For instance, Leuski & Traum (2008) relaxed this 
requirement. Given a database of generation rules, their algorithm responds 
to a user input by finding a generation rule whose decomposition template is 
most similar to the user input, no longer requiring an exact match. This 
means that the system will able to respond in more situations. This of course 
has to be traded off against the fact that some of the system’s responses may 
be less relevant or appropriate.  
 
CODA: Automatic harvesting of generation rules 
A further area in which progress has been made is the automatic harvesting 
of generation rules from text. For this purpose, it is best to think of a 
generation rule as a short dialogue fragment (e.g. a question followed by an 
answer). A dialogue system utilises such rules by recognising that the user’s 
input, e.g. a question, matches with the beginning of such a fragment, and 
responding with the remainder of the fragment. In the CODA project
5
  
(Piwek & Stoyanchev, 2010), automatically extracting such rules was 
addressed in three steps. Firstly, a set of monologue-dialogue pairs was 
constructed in which professionally-authored dialogue was aligned with 
monologue expressing the same information.  
 
Table 1: Example of monologue-dialogue pairs, with the monologue on the left-hand side and 
dialogue expressing the same information on the right-hand side. The monologue is annotated 
with rhetorical relations (Attribution, Contrast) and the dialogue is annotated with dialogue 
acts (Yes/No Question, Explain, Answer No). 
Monologue Dialogue (from Twain 1919: 14 and 1) 
 
Text Rhetorical 
relation 
Speaker Text Dialogue 
act 
One cannot 
doubt that he 
felt well. 
Attribution  
 
OM He felt well? Yes/No 
Question 
YM One cannot doubt it. Explain 
 
The metals 
are not 
suddenly 
deposited in 
the ores. It is 
the patient 
work of 
countless 
ages. 
Contrast 
 
OM Are the metals suddenly 
deposited in the ores? 
Yes/No 
Question 
YM No -- Answer No 
YM it is the patient work of 
countless ages. 
Explain 
 
Both the monologue and the dialogue were analysed for patterns, using 
rhetorical structure theory and dialogue act annotation. An example is 
provided in Table 1. Secondly, from this resource, rules were automatically 
constructed that mapped patterns in monologue to dialogue patterns.
 6
 
Finally, these rules could then be applied to new monologue to extract 
generation rules, e.g. in the shape of question-answer pairs. This approach 
was used to automatically create generation rules for a virtual instructor that 
explains consent forms for clinical trials (Kuyten et al., 2012).  
 
In fact, CODA was initially conceived for a different purpose. The 
aforementioned automatic monologue-to-dialogue mapping can also be used 
to turn an extended piece of monologue into a dialogue. This opens the 
possibility of automatically creating a short film script from a text. For 
example, the CODA approach was applied to leaflets from a charity, the 
Papworth trust, to generate short film scripts that presented the information 
from the leaflets in a different medium. 
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 CODA is short for ‘COherent Dialogue Automatically generated from text’. It was a two-
year project funded by the UK EPSRC research council under grant EP/G020981/1.  
6
 The resource, annotation tools and rules are available under Creative Commons license 
via the CODA project homepage at http://computing.open.ac.uk/coda/ 
4. Agenda-driven systems  
Reactive systems take the user’s input, transform it, and present the result to 
the user. Such a system translates the user’s language into a system 
response. The transformations for achieving this stay at the surface of the 
user’s input. The dialogue store merely stores the user’s input and the 
successive transformed versions, until a response has been constructed and 
is ready to be released back to the user.    
We use the term agenda-driven systems for dialogue systems that have their 
own agenda. Such systems are driven not only by what the user says, but 
also by their own goals and plans. We will distinguish between three types 
of agenda-driven systems, according to the agenda’s flexibility: 
1. fixed-task agenda 
2. selected-task agenda 
3. joint-task agenda  
 
4.1 Fixed-task agenda 
Systems based on a fixed-task agenda are aimed at helping the user with one 
specific pre-defined task. A classical example is the task of obtaining travel 
information. The dialogue system plays the intermediary between the user 
and a database. The user has a goal: they want to travel from A to B at time t 
and need to know available connections. This information can be obtained 
from the database. However, the language that the database ‘speaks’ is not 
the user’s, rather it is formal database query language. The dialogue 
system’s goal is to obtain the place of departure and destination and travel 
time from the user. It then translates this into an appropriate query which it 
puts to the database. The database supplies an answer which the system 
translates back into language that the user understands. The following is a 
transcript of an interaction with the first publicly available system of this 
kind, the Philips automatic train timetable information system.
7
  
 
(11) 1 System Good morning, this is the automatic time-
table information service.  How can I help 
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 The key ideas behind this type of system can be traced back even further to work by 
Daniel Bobrow and colleagues at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center on the GUS travel agent 
system (Bobrow et al., 1977). 
you? 
 2 Caller Good morning. I need a connection from 
Hamburg to Munich. 
 3 System When would you like to go from Hamburg 
to Munich? 
 4 Caller Next Friday, er, at eight o’clock. 
 5 System So you want to travel on Sunday the 25
th
 of 
September at 8am? 
 6 Caller No, on Friday. 
 7 System So you want to travel on Friday the 23
rd
 of 
September at 8am? 
 8 Caller Exactly. 
 9 System There is the following connection: With 
Intercity Express 793, departure from 
Hamburg at 8:02, arrival in Munich at 
14:05. Would you like me to repeat the 
connection? 
 10 Caller No, but I need a return trip on Sunday. 
 11 System (…) 
(Extract from Aust et al., 1995: 251) 
In agenda-driven systems, the direct link between user input and system 
response is no longer present. The system’s utterances are motivated 
primarily by the underlying task. This is reflected by the kind of dialogue 
game that fixed-task systems play. In particular, the dialogue store includes 
the system’s agenda. In the case of a travel information system, the agenda 
consists of the following ordered list of items:  
1. ask for the place of departure 
2. ask for the destination 
3. ask for the time of travel 
4. provide the connection  
This agenda is private to the system. At the outset of the conversation, the 
user may not know that the system is going to proactively seek this 
information.  
Apart from this private section of the dialogue store, there is a common 
section. This section stores the information the interlocutors have, so far, 
shared with each other. It focuses on information related to the task. The 
common section of the store has three slots (corresponding with the first 
three items on the private agenda):  
 point of departure:  ___ 
 destination:   ___ 
 travel time:    ___ 
Ignoring the initial exchange of greetings,
8
 let’s look at (11.2). An update 
rule scans the user’s utterance for possible fillers for these slots. In this case, 
the words ‘to’ and ‘from’ suggest the presence of such fillers: ‘from 
Hamburg’ and ‘to Munich’. The private section is updated as follows: 
 point of departure:  Hamburg (unconfirmed) 
 destination:   Munich (unconfirmed) 
 travel time:    ___ 
As shown, the system isn’t yet entirely sure whether the user really wants to 
go from Hamburg to Munich; these slots are, as yet, unconfirmed. It may for 
instance, be that the system misheard the user.  
In this game, the system relies on a generation rule which does two things: it 
retrieves the next item on the agenda and any unconfirmed slots, and 
formulates an utterance relating to the next agenda item (provided the next 
item can be carried out), whilst also confirming any unconfirmed slots. In 
the dialogue, this is utterance (11.3): the system asks for the time of travel 
and tries to confirm the place of departure and destination. Note that agenda 
items 1. and 2 are skipped since the user provided a point of departure and 
destination even before the system could explicitly ask for these. 
The user responds with the time of travel (11.4) and the private section is 
updated accordingly: 
 point of departure:  Hamburg (confirmed) 
 destination:   Munich (confirmed) 
 travel time:    Sept 25, 8am, Sunday (unconfirmed) 
Because the user didn’t refer to the place of departure and the destination, 
these are considered confirmed. The travel time has been entered, but is as 
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 An initial greeting can be dealt by a simple generating rule which stipulates that at the 
start of a conversation the system produces an utterance along the lines of ‘Good ___, this 
is the automatic time-table information service.  How can I help you?’. Depending on the 
time of day, ___ is replaced with ‘morning’, ‘afternoon’ or ‘evening’. 
yet unconfirmed. On this occasion the system has misheard what the user 
said. The generation rule is again applied. In this case, there is no agenda 
item to ask about (since the final agenda item can only be carried out once 
all slots are known). However, there is an unconfirmed slot, and so the 
system asks about this slot: ‘So you want to travel on Sunday the 25th of 
September at 8am?’ (11.5) In response, the user utters a correction: ‘No, on 
Friday.’ (11.6) The system updates the common section accordingly: 
 point of departure:  Hamburg (unconfirmed) 
 destination:   Munich (confirmed) 
 travel time:    Sept 23, 8am, Friday (unconfirmed) 
Note that the system has worked out that Friday means Sept 25. The 
corrected travel time is, however, still unconfirmed. The generation rule is 
applied once more, and the system utters ‘So you want to travel on Friday 
the 23
rd
 of September at 8am?’ (11.7) The user responds with the 
confirmation ‘Exactly’ (11.8). Finally, all the slots are confirmed and the 
system can proceed with the final agenda item: retrieving the train 
connection from the database and providing the information to the user 
(11.9).  
 
4.2 Selected-task agenda 
In the case of the train timetable information system, the dialogue is 
structured by the slots that the system needs to fill to accomplish the task. 
Recent personal assistants, such as Siri, Google Now and Cortana, operate 
in a similar way. These systems can, however, assist with more than one 
task. Whenever the user says something, the system first needs to determine 
which task the user has in mind. For instance, tasks that can be 
accomplished with the help of Siri include: launching an application, 
sending messages, accessing restaurant recommendations, adding reminders 
to the calendar, and setting the alarm and searching on the web. Here is 
dialogue in which the user engages Siri to place a call: 
 
(12) 1 User Activates Siri by pressing a specific button 
on the phone or saying ‘Hey Siri’ 
 2 User Call Joe. 
 3 Siri Just to confirm – you’d like to call Joe 
Bloggs? [Cancel]   [Call]  
 4 User Selects cancel by pushing the button on the 
touch screen 
 5 Siri Ok. 
   (Based on conversation with Siri on June 
20 2015) 
Because Siri can assist with many different tasks, on each occasion it needs 
to establish which task the user is currently talking about. For this it looks 
for keywords such as ‘Call’, ‘Launch’, ‘Search for’, etc. In this example, it 
finds a match with ‘Call’. To place the call Siri needs a name. Generally, the 
tasks that Siri deals with involve only a single slot. The name provided by 
the user is matched against the user’s address book. If a matching name 
exists, Siri confirms that it has identified the correct address book entry. If 
confirmed, it proceeds to place the call. All this, when compared to the train 
timetable system, results in a relatively brief dialogue. 
Apart from the length of conversations, there are two further key differences 
between Siri and the train timetable system. First, Siri can access various 
bits of contextual information that the user has stored on their mobile phone 
- in contrast with the train timetable system which is accessed by calling a 
landline number. In our example, Siri can only perform its task, because it 
has permission to consult the user’s address book. Second, Siri interacts 
with the user by means of a combination of media. In our example, it uses 
speech but also the touch screen (to obtain the user’s confirmation). In 
response to another query “Where is the nearest supermarket”, it will bring 
up a map. In that case, it also draws on the user’s location (as provided by 
the phone’s GPS system), to work out the nearest supermarket. 
When Siri has determined the task, it needs to establish the slot value. E.g., 
for the ‘Where’ question in the previous paragraph, it uses ‘supermarket’. It 
works out that this is a type of location, rather than, say, a street name. 
Sometimes it will however get this wrong. For instance, when asking 
‘Where is the sea’, whilst being only 2 miles away from the sea front in the 
South-east of England, it came back with ‘The only possibility I found is the 
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport on International Blvd in Sea Tac.’ and 
a map of this airport. The hedge ‘The only possibility I found’ suggests that 
Siri had some idea that the answer might not be what I was looking for. 
 
4.3 Joint-task agenda 
Both fixed-task and selected-task systems have an agenda, but this agenda is 
relatively rigid. It involves a single task, whether fixed in advance or 
selected by the user. In this section we consider systems that operate with a 
joint-task agenda. Such systems are distinct from fixed and selected-task 
systems in two important ways. Firstly, the task at hand is established as 
part of the conversation, rather than being determined or guessed at by one 
of the parties. Secondly, the interlocutors collaborate on achieving this task. 
In particular, they jointly plan and then carry out actions that lead to its 
achievement. 
Joint-task systems are still confined to the research laboratory. In fact, their 
theoretical underpinnings go back to the 1970s. The pioneering work in this 
area is exemplified by a system that was developed as an exercise in 
theoretical psychology. The author of this system emphasized that  
We are not yet able to construct formally precise theories of advanced 
cognitive processes such as language understanding (…) The present 
model will have served its purpose if it (a) highlights some problems 
in the organisation of dialogue which the reader may not have 
explicitly noticed, (b) explores a clear set of ideas for solving these 
problems (the most important idea in this case being the 
‘conversational procedure’), and (c) exposes the limitations of these 
ideas and therefore helps someone to construct a better theory. 
(Power, 1979: 109) 
and this still remains largely true today. Power’s (1979) system involves 
two computer programs, ‘John’ and ‘Mary’ that can engage in a 
conversation with each other. They inhabit a simple virtual world consisting 
of a room with a door through which one can enter or leave the room (see 
Figure 3). The door is fitted with a bolt that is either up or down.  
 
 
Figure 2: A visualisation of the virtual world in which the John and Mary programs operate. 
John and Mary have different capabilities. Both can move around and slide 
the bolt, but only Mary can push the door. John can see things, whereas 
Mary is blind. As a result, John and Mary have to cooperate to achieve 
certain goals. In particular, we shall look at a conversation that took place 
when John found himself outside the room, with the door bolted:  
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 In the actual conversation between John and Mary, before each new section of dialogue 
(e.g. suggesting a goal, making a plan), the initiating partner calls the other by name and the 
addressee than acknowledges, as in:  
  
 John Mary 
 Mary Yes. 
 
For the sake of brevity, we’ve omitted these dialogue acts. 
(13)  1 John I want to suggest a goal. 
  2 Mary Go ahead. 
  3 John Will you help me get in? 
  4 Mary By all means. 
  5 John Shall we make a plan. 
  6 Mary May I ask you something 
  7 John Go ahead. 
  8 Mary Are you in? 
  9 John No. 
  10 Mary Shall we make a plan? 
  11 John Okay. 
  12 Mary Is the door open? 
  13 John No 
  14 Mary I suggest that we get the door open and then 
you move. 
  15 John I want to explain something. 
  16 Mary Go ahead. 
  17 John If one moves, nothing happens. 
  18 Mary I disagree. If one moves when the door is open 
one changes position. 
  19 John I see. 
  20 Mary I suggest that we get the door open and then 
you move. 
  21 John All right. 
  22 Mary Shall we make a plan? 
  23 John Okay. 
  24 Mary  I suggest that I push the door. 
    (…) 
(Power, 1979: 116-118)
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This conversation emerged as a result of the two programs, John and Mary, 
addressing the situation they found themselves in. Both had a desire for 
John to join Mary in the room, but needed to cooperate to achieve that end. 
Each can be thought of as playing a dialogue game. The conversational 
score has a number of novel components. In particular, rather than a simple 
agenda, it now contains a plan, which is constructed in the course of the 
conversation (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 3: A visualisation of the plan that John and Mary construct. 
This plan is no longer a simple sequence of actions, but shows that some 
goals require that one or more other goals are achieved. For instance, for 
John to be inside the room, the door needs to be opened and then he can 
move. After having proposed the goal (13.1), John suggests to make a plan 
for achieving the goal (13.5). Mary is not able see, so she first checks with 
John whether the goal has already been achieved (13.6-9). They then 
proceed to flesh out the plan. There is a further complication along the way. 
Each interlocutor has beliefs about the world, which populate the belief 
section of their dialogue store. In particular, John originally has the 
erroneous belief that if he moves, nothing happens. He is set straight on this 
one in (13.15-19). As the conversation proceeds the plan and beliefs are 
updated and new utterances are produced. 
The generation of new utterances is driven by the planning process. 
Planning systems have been pivotal in Artificial Intelligence research from 
its inception in the 1950s. What makes the John and Mary programs 
different is that they coordinate and achieve their goals through 
communication. When one of them realises that they can’t achieve a goal on 
their own (e.g. for John to get inside the room), they initiate a conversation 
which allows them to jointly achieve the goal. This is done through 
conversational procedures (such as ‘ChooseGoal’, ‘AgreePlan’ and ‘Ask’). 
John and Mary maintain a control stack that records which procedures are 
currently active. For the dialogue to be successful, they need to carefully 
coordinate their control stacks, which they achieve by explicitly announcing 
conversational procedures (e.g. 13.1, 13.5 and 13.10).  
John and Mary’s dialogue is more complex than any of the dialogues so far, 
requiring a more complex dialogue store which includes a plan, beliefs and 
a control stack. The dynamics of the store can be modelled in terms of 
update and generation rules.   
5. Research frontiers 
We have outlined some of the core ideas behind dialogue systems and seen 
that recent systems make extensive use of contextual information and 
multimodal interaction. In this section, we want to briefly highlight two 
developments that are still confined to the research lab, as a selective 
illustration of current research.  
So far, the systems we have looked at take a complete utterance, process it 
in some way, and then respond. In human-human dialogue, interlocutors 
don’t wait until the other has finished before they start processing what was 
said. They may even interrupt each other mid utterance: 
 
For a system to accomplish this, it needs to analyse input in a piecemeal, 
incremental word-by-word fashion. A number of theories and computer 
models, such as Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al., 2001; Gregoromichelaki 
et al., 2011), are being developed to do exactly this.  
A second development that we would like to highlight is the study of non-
cooperative dialogue. All systems we described engage in cooperative 
dialogues. In recent years, the first models of non-cooperative dialogue have 
(14) A: They X-rayed me, and took a urine sample, took a blood 
sample. Er, the doctor 
 B: Chorlton? 
 A: Chorlton, mhmm, he examined me, erm, he, he said now 
they were on about a slide huncleari on my heart. [BNC: 
KPY1005-1008]  
(Cited from Gregoromichelaki et al., 2011: 212) 
been constructed (Plüss et al, 2011, Plüss, 2013). In this work, a dialogue 
game-based approach is used to deal with non-cooperation in political 
interviews. The idea is that certain utterances put an obligation on the 
addressee to respond in a particular way (e.g. a question should be followed 
by an answer) – we can think of these obligations as being imposed by 
generation rules. In other words, the set of legitimate moves is constrained 
by previous utterances. The key ingredient of the new model is the way the 
dialogue strategy relates to these obligations. So far, we have assumed that 
the dialogue strategy selects an utterance from this set of legitimate moves – 
the ones that are compatible with the speaker’s obligations. Plüss considers 
a more liberal strategy where an interlocutor may chose a move that is not 
legitimate, but serves a private goal. E.g., in a political interview, a 
politician may choose to evade a question and raise, instead, an issue that 
they want to discuss. Key to such a model is a clear distinction between the 
dialogue rules (the game) and the strategy – as we have seen, many existing 
system do not distinguish between the two.   
6. Concluding remarks 
A dialogue system can be seen as playing a dialogue game. We looked at 
two distinct kinds of dialogue game that current systems engage in: reactive 
and agenda-driven. Reactive systems take the user’s utterance, reorganise, 
prune and embellish it, and then play it back to the user. Any intelligence is 
in the eye of the beholder. Agenda-driven systems maintain a representation 
of things to do, the agenda. This agenda drives what they say next. Agenda-
driven come in three flavours: fixed-tasked, selected-task and joint-task. 
Both fixed-task and selected-task systems orient the conversation around a 
single well-defined task. This task may be fixed, even before the 
conversation has started, or be selected by the user in their initial move. 
Selected-task systems have become a standard accessory of mobile phones, 
witness Siri (for the iPhone), Google Now (for Android phones) and 
Cortana (for Windows devices).     
In contrast with fictional dialogue systems, such as Ava and HAL, the goals 
these dialogue systems pursue are simple and the idea that they could 
develop malicious or human-unfriendly goals seems far-fetched. In 
particular, Ava and HAL’s intelligent assessment of the situation and 
deliberate violation of the wishes of their human masters is at odds with 
how current dialogue systems operate.  
If anything, it seems more likely that, at least in the foreseeable future, the 
danger lies not so much with systems that deliberately come into conflict 
with their human masters, but rather with systems that, inevitably, 
sometimes make mistakes. Such mistakes arise when the system 
misunderstands what their human user wants. If such a system then 
nevertheless proceeds with carrying out what it thinks the user wants, there 
may be undesirable consequences. For this reason, current systems have 
safeguards. In particular, such systems ask the user for explicit confirmation 
before carrying out a task (e.g. the user is given the option to cancel or 
proceed with making a call).  
As the capability of dialogue systems evolves and joint-action based 
systems move from the lab into the real-world, such safeguards will be more 
and more difficult to sustain. It will be impractical to rely on a system for 
accomplishing a complex task (which may involve many decisions and 
inferences) and expect it to ask for confirmation for each and every 
individual action that is required to accomplish the task. Just like we 
wouldn’t want a human personal assistant to ask for permission for every 
action they undertake (which may range from putting a staple through a pile 
of paper to releasing a few thousand pounds from a budget to pay for some 
item). If such systems are to be relied upon, they will need to be able to 
make common sense judgements about when to ask for confirmation. Even 
if we can equip machines with the knowledge to make such judgements, 
they will get it wrong on occasion - just as we humans are not infallible 
when it comes to applying common sense.  
The question therefore arises under what circumstances we would accept 
such systems. And this question is tied to practical issues such as: What 
would be their legal status? Who would be responsible if things go wrong? I 
would like to surmise that dialogue may be part of the answer: if we are to 
ever accept such systems, they’d need to able to discuss their reasons and 
goals – it’s unlikely that we would trust systems that we don’t understand. 
Currently, research on dialogue systems still has some way to go before we 
have systems that are able to discuss why they said or did something and 
learn from the discussion – in short, be self-validating dialogue systems. 
Arguably, such self-validating dialogue systems would also be more 
deserving of the claim that they engage in genuine dialogue.  
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